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Until recently, marijuana, a controlled narcotic under federal law since 1970, had been 
unlawful in all fifty states.1 As a result of politically unacceptable outcomes in the 
criminal justice system resulting from arrests and convictions for marijuana possession, 
many states, including Illinois, have liberalized their drug laws. In 2014, the Illinois 
General Assembly legalized marijuana used for medical purposes.2 More recently, the 
General Assembly legalized recreational marijuana.3 Despite legalizing marijuana for 
medicinal or recreational use, the General Assembly did not specifically address the 
impact of these laws on the workplace.  In fact, in both instances, the General Assembly 
attempted to preserve the status quo in the workplace by allowing employers to continue 
to enforce workplace drug policies, including zero-tolerance policies.4 Based on this new 
legislative framework, adult employees using marijuana need no longer fear the 
constable, but they must still be mindful of the HR Director. 
 
Part II of this Article discusses the federal government’s treatment of marijuana over the 
years. Part III reviews the data documenting the human and economic costs associated 
with enforcing marijuana laws and argues that the outcomes in the criminal justice 
system, having become untenable, established the conditions that made legalization 
efforts in some of the individual states possible. Part IV examines Illinois’s medical 
marijuana law and discusses impact of medical marijuana drugs on the workplace. Part 
V describes the opioid epidemic and its relationship to the Illinois Alternative to Opioids 
Act of 2018. Part VI discusses Illinois’s recent recreational marijuana statute and 
describes how this law will affect the workplace. Even though Illinois’s medical and 
recreational marijuana laws specifically attempted to preserve the status quo for 
employees, this Article will conclude in Part VII by arguing that consumer demand for 
marijuana and labor market conditions will diminish the value of the employer 
protections in the Recreational Cannabis Act and will ultimately force Illinois employers 
to liberalize their existing policies regarding marijuana. 
 
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MARIJUANA 
 
In what may come as a surprise to anyone who has read a newspaper in the last fifty 
years, “[f]or most of American history, marijuana was legal to grow and consume.”5  
People used marijuana recreationally, while doctors and pharmacists prescribed it to 




treat numerous conditions,6 including fatigue, coughing fits, asthma, rheumatism, 
delirium tremens, migraine headaches, and menstrual symptoms.7 Marijuana’s 
inclusion in the U.S. Pharmacopoeia in 18508 is a testament to its perceived medicinal 
value in the mid-nineteenth century.   
 
Attempts by the individual states to regulate marijuana began in the early part of the 
twentieth century and were largely driven by racism and xenophobia occasioned by the 
presence of black and Latino migrant workers.9 In 1919, California was one of the first 
states to prohibit the sale and possession of marijuana.10 Illinois outlawed marijuana in 
1931.11 The first attempt by the federal government to regulate marijuana occurred in 
193712 when Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act.13 The Marihuana Tax Act did not 
outlaw marijuana per se, but instead required those who sold or possessed marijuana, 
as well as physicians who prescribed it, to purchase a tax stamp.14 Congress set the tax at 
such a prohibitively high rate that the Marihuana Tax Act “was tantamount to a legal 
prohibition.”15 Violators of the Marihuana Tax Act were charged with “tax evasion” and 
faced maximum fines of $2,000 and five years in jail.16 Notably, the American Medical 
Association opposed the legislation, suggesting that the physicians of the day saw 
medicinal value in prescribing marijuana to patients.17 However, in 1941, marijuana was 
removed from the U.S. Pharmacopoeia.18 
 
In 1951, Congress passed the Boggs Act, which established harsh mandatory minimum 
sentences for simple possession of marijuana, as well as other drugs.19 Specifically, an 
initial conviction for drug possession resulted in a mandatory two-year minimum 
sentence; a second conviction carried from five to ten years; and a third carried from ten 
to twenty years.20 As Matthew Braun writes, “The 1951 Boggs Act was enacted because 
politicians pushed a narrative that marijuana was used by African Americans and 
Mexican Americans.”21 Five years later, in 1956, Congress passed the Narcotic Control 
Act and actually increased the penalties set forth in the Boggs Act.22  
 
A. Controlled Substances Act 
 
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
(“Comprehensive Drug Act”) which repealed the mandatory minimum sentences of the 
earlier legislation, and consolidated the nation’s drug laws generally. 23 Title II of the 
Comprehensive Drug Act is the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).24 The CSA 
established five schedules of controlled substances and classified marijuana as a 
Schedule I drug, alongside such drugs as LSD, cocaine, heroin, and peyote.25 
Marijuana’s status as a Schedule I drug was based on Congress’s determination that it 
“has a high potential for abuse” and “has no currently accepted medical use in treatment 
in the United States,” and that “there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug … 
under medical supervision.”26 Opiates are listed as Schedule II drugs.27 According to the 
CSA, though Schedule II drugs like opiates have “a high potential for abuse,” they are 
distinguishable from Schedule I drugs because they have a “currently accepted medical 
use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe 
restrictions.”28 “The CSA provides for the periodic updating of schedules and delegates 
to the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, to add, remove or transfer substances to, from or between schedules.”29 After 




Congress passed the CSA, marijuana was finally outlawed in all fifty states.30 Marijuana 
remains a Schedule I narcotic today, notwithstanding considerable efforts to reschedule 
the drug.31 In fact, there is legislation currently pending in Congress to remove cannabis 
from the CSA.32 
 
For many years, the CSA set forth the basic framework for regulating drug use in society 
and the workplace. To the extent there were any changes in drug laws, the changes 
created greater restrictions regarding the use of drugs in the workplace. For example, 
the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 requires some federal contractors and all federal 
grant recipients to agree to maintain a drug-free workplace as a precondition for 
receiving a federal contract.33 Covered employers must publish a statement that 
controlled substances are prohibited in the workplace, punish employees convicted of 
drug offenses, and make a good faith effort to maintain a drug-free workplace.34    
 
B. Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act 
  
In 1991, Congress passed the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act in 
response to its perception that “drug and alcohol abuse [had] become an increasing 
problem in the workplace.”35 The statute directed the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (“DOT”) to develop drug and alcohol regulations for employees in the 
railroad, trucking, aviation, and mass-transit industries.36 In 1994, the various 
administrations within DOT, including the Federal Highway Administration (“FHA”) 
and the Federal Transit Authority (“FTA”), promulgated regulations pursuant to the 
Congressional mandate. Under rules promulgated by the FHA and the FTA, covered 
employers must perform drug and alcohol testing on every employee performing a 
“safety-sensitive function,”37 including employees of intrastate motor carriers who 
perform “safety sensitive functions.”38 Required testing includes: random testing,39 pre-
employment testing,40 reasonable suspicion testing,41 post-accident testing42 and 
return-to-duty testing.43 When an employee tests positive for drug use or refuses to 
submit to a required test, the FHA and FTA rules require the employer to remove the 
employee from the safety-sensitive function44 until such time as the employee is 
evaluated and tests negative for drugs on a return-to-duty test.45 Notably, the 
regulations do not require an employer to discipline or terminate an employee who fails 
a drug test. The DOT regulations inform many collective bargaining agreements 
covering employees working in safety-sensitive industries or holding commercial 
drivers’ licenses (“CDLs”). 
 
Even though alcohol abuse can be just as damaging to individual employees, and 
ultimately the workplace, drugs are often treated more harshly than alcohol in collective 
bargaining agreements. For example, the Joint Labor Management Uniform 
Drug/Alcohol Abuse Program46 incorporated into the collective bargaining agreements 
entered into between Local 150 of the International Union of Operating Engineers (as 
well as other trades) and the Mid-America Bargaining Association (“MARBA”) treats 
drug-related infractions differently than alcohol-related infractions. These collective 
bargaining agreements cover thousands of employees working in the construction 
industry throughout northeast Illinois. On its face, the Policy provides that employees 
testing positive for drug use “will be fired.”47 In contrast, the Policy provides that 




“[e]mployees found under the influence of alcohol while on duty, or while operating a 
company vehicle, will be subject to termination.”48 Thus, the Policy takes a zero 
tolerance approach to drugs, while allowing for leniency in cases involving alcohol.  
One explanation for the Policy’s disparate treatment of drugs and alcohol could be that 
drugs like marijuana were unlawful and the negotiators were justified in attempting to 
rid the workplace of illicit drugs. Another more subtle explanation is that labor and 
management negotiators were more likely to drink alcohol than to use drugs, making 
them less sympathetic to drugs than alcohol. Regardless of the explanation, the 
existence of federal drug laws and regulations made it easy for labor and management to 
take a hard line on drugs—particularly in safety-sensitive industries.  
 
C. 2014 and 2018 Farm Bills 
 
“Cannabinoid is the name given to all the chemical compounds found in cannabis, the 
plant genus that includes both hemp and marijuana.”49 Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 
and cannabidiol (CBD) and are the most common cannabinoids found in cannabis.50 
THC is the psychoactive ingredient causing euphoria.51 CBD, in contrast, is 
nonintoxicating and does not produce euphoria or psychoactive effects.52 THC and CBD 
are both present in hemp and marijuana; marijuana is rich in THC; hemp is richer in 
CBD.”53  The initial definition “marihuana” under the CSA was broad enough to include 
both hemp and marijuana.54     
 
Many Americans first learned of CBD in 2013 when Dr. Sanjay Gupta hosted a program 
on CNN in which he profiled a six-year-old girl in living in Colorado who used CBD to 
reduce seizures caused by epilepsy.55 The program generated immediate interest in, as 
well as demand for, CBD oil.56  As the New York Times reported, “Mere weeks after the 
CNN documentary aired, the spike in CBD interest prompted the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority to issue an investor alert on marijuana stock scams:  As the F.D.A. 
would later show, many online CBD products contained little or no CBD whatsoever.”57 
 
In a seemingly unrelated earlier event, in 2011, James Comer won an election for 
Kentucky state agriculture commissioner after campaigning to legalize industrial 
hemp.58 Comer’s core constituents were Kentucky tobacco farmers desperate for a new 
cash crop.59 Giving heed to Tip O’Neill’s oft-cited adage that “all politics is local,” Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky later included a hemp pilot program for 
“research” in the Agriculture Act of 2014 (also known as the 2014 Farm Bill).60 Colorado 
Congressman, now Governor of Colorado, Jared Polis, also sponsored the pilot 
program.61 The legislation defined hemp as cannabis containing less that 0.3 percent 
THC.62  The 0.3 percent threshold was not based in science; it was, instead, an arbitrary 
threshold.63  The New York Times reports that “entrepreneurs interpreted this research-
oriented pilot program as the de facto legalization of cannabidiol”64—which is curious 
since “the 2014 Farm Bill did not modify the [CSA] to exclude from Schedule I either 
hemp or products containing THC derived from hemp.”65   
 
In December 2018, Congress passed the Agricultural Improvement Act of 201866 (also 
known as the 2018 Farm Bill), which, based on language inserted by Senator 
McConnell67 defined hemp as “the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, 




including the seeds thereof and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, 
salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a [THC] concentration of not 
more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis” 68 and removed hemp from classification 
as marijuana under the CSA.69 This opened the door to the lifting of restrictions on the 
sale, transfer and possession of hemp, as well as the sale, transfer, and possession of its 
components—including CBD.70  
 
Importantly, the 2018 Farm Bill did not legalize CBD outright. Instead, the 2018 Farm 
Bill provides that CBD “derived from hemp will be legal, if and only if that hemp is 
produced in a manner consistent with the Farm Bill … and by a licensed grower.”71 CBD 
produced in other settings remains an illegal Schedule I narcotic.72 And cannabis with 
more than 0.3% THC remains a Schedule I narcotic under the CSA.73 As Catie 
Wightman notes, “The difference between hemp and marijuana comes down to a tenth 
of a percent of THC; Cannabis sativa L. is legal hemp at 0.3% THC but becomes illegal 
marijuana at 0.4% THC.”74 She adds: “The difference between illegal hemp and illegal 
marijuana is impossible to see with the naked eye and determining the quantity of THC 
to such a degree requires sensitive testing equipment.”75 
 
CBD has been touted as an effective treatment for depression, insomnia, brain injury, 
opioid addiction, diabetes, arthritis, inflammation and joint pain, and nausea from 
chemotherapy.76 Despite its increasing popularity, “[m]ost of the information about 
CBD’s effects in humans is anecdotal or extrapolated from animal studies, and few 
rigorous trials have been conducted,”77 causing at least one doctor to characterize CBD 
as an “expensive placebo” rather than a “panacea.”78 The Federal Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) explains, “[o]ther than one prescription drug product to treat two rare, severe 
forms of epilepsy, [the FDA] has not approved any other CBD products, and there is 
very limited available information about CBD, including about its effects on the body.”79 
In 2017, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine found limited 
evidence of the ability of CBD to treat anxiety.80 Beyond that, according to the Center for 
Science in the Public Interest, there is no evidence that CBD “will lower the risk of 
diabetes, shrink tumors, wean a person off opioids, ease schizophrenia or calm anxious 
pets.”81 There is, however, encouraging research indicating that CBD used by recovering 
opioid addicts has proven effective in helping them avoid relapse.82  
 
In 2019, the policy director for the Center for Science in the Public Interest observed 
that since the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill, “the marketplace [has been] full of 
products that are essentially unknown” and that consumers are not aware “that they are 
guinea pigs.”83 Undeterred by the scientific uncertainty, a recent survey conducted by an 
investment bank found that 7% of adults in the United States, 17 million people, had 
reported using CBD in the months following the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill.84 
Similarly, in 2019, Gallop surveyed 2,500 Americans and found 14% reported using CBD 
for pain, anxiety and sleep issues.85 Usage of CBD will likely continue to increase as it 
becomes more available and as people continue to report positive results (actual or 
perceived) after using CBD products. A cannabis market research firm predicted sales of 
CBD will reach $22 billion by 2022.86  
 




The FDA currently has jurisdiction to regulate hemp. Remarkably, the agency has 
neither evaluated nor approved any of the CBD products sold over the counter today, an 
array that includes oils, creams, bath bombs and dog treats.87 Indeed, though CBD is 
explicitly not allowed in dietary supplements or foods, “the FDA has tended to overlook 
these infractions.”88 Because of limited resources, and perhaps the anti-regulatory 
fervor of the Trump administration, the FDA’s regulatory oversight has been limited to 
“warn[ing] companies to stop making unfounded claims” and engaging in deceptive 
advertising.89 The FDA has filed only nine warning letters against CBD companies; 
those companies faced “few serious repercussions.”90 
 
There are currently over 1,000 products available online containing CBD.91 CBD 
products are often marketed to suggest that they do not contain any THC or, if they do, 
that the THC will not be detected on a drug test.92 On December 14, 2016, the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency responded to a comment about whether a proposed rule regarding 
marijuana extracts was applicable to CBD if not combined with other cannabinols, like 
THC.93  The DEA responded, “For practical purposes, all extracts that contain CBD will 
also contain at least small amounts of other cannabinoids.”94 In a footnote, the DEA 
further explained, “Although it might be theoretically possible to produce a CBD extract 
that contains absolutely no amounts of other cannabinoids, the DEA is not aware of any 
industrially-utilized methods that have achieved this result.”95   
 
A 2012 study published in the Journal of Analytical Toxicology found that a common 
forensic drug testing method can easily mistake CBD for THC,96 resulting in false 
positive result for an employee using a CBD product. Moreover, a 2017 study published 
in the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”) found that after testing 
84 CBD products purchased online, 26.19% of the samples had less CBD than indicated 
on the label, while 43.85% of the samples had more CBD than indicated on the label.97 
Only 30.95% of the products tested were labeled accurately.98 That is, nearly 70% of the 
products were labeled incorrectly. Notably, THC was detected in 18 of the 84 samples at 
levels the authors of the study observed “may be sufficient to produce intoxication or 
impairment, especially among children.”99 The authors concluded by explaining that 
their “findings highlight the need for manufacturing and testing standards, and 
oversight of medical cannabis products.”100 The JAMA study confirms the unregulated 
nature of the nascent CBD industry; its detection of THC in levels capable of producing 
intoxication in over 20% of the products tested should give pause to any employee 
subject to drug testing who is considering using a CBD-infused product. Based on the 
findings, an employee subject to workplace drug testing who uses a lawful CBD product 
(even one marketed as being undetectable on a drug test) has a 20% chance that THC 
will be detected.    
 
As will be discussed more thoroughly below, CBD will have a dramatic impact on the 
workplace. At the risk of oversimplification, Congress legalized hemp because the Senate 
Majority Leader wanted to create a new cash crop for struggling tobacco farmers in his 
state. The impact of CBD on the workplace was never debated prior to the passage of the 
2018 Farm Bill and neither Congress nor the Department of Labor has offered any 
guidance to employers obligated to maintain a drug-free workplaces under federal law 
as to how they should respond when their employees begin taking unregulated CBD that 




is laced with TCH. It will now be up to practitioners to figure out how to integrate CBD 
into existing drug policies.    
 
III. MARIJUANA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
From a criminal justice perspective, federal and state drug laws have had a devastating 
effect on communities, as well as state and local budgets. In 1971, President Nixon 
officially declared war on drugs.101 He identified drugs as “public enemy number one” 
and announced that “in order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a 
new, all-out offensive.”102 One commentator observed that with those words, President 
Nixon “laid the foundation for a return to rigid, punitive drug sentencing” and “cast 
would-be drug offenders as dangerous enemies to be fought with the force of the 
criminal justice system.”103 President Nixon was the first president to address drugs as a 
“central national-policy concern”; his predecessors “generally did not involve 
themselves actively in drug control policy.” 104 Former Nixon aide John Ehrlichman 
conceded in a 1994 interview that Nixon intended his war on drugs to undermine his 
perceived enemies; he explained:  
 
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that had two 
enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We 
knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by 
getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, 
and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We 
could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify 
them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the 
drugs? Of course we did.105 
 
Presidents Ford and Carter both “distanced themselves from the drug issue.”106  One 
commentator observed that President Ford “largely backed away from Former President 
Nixon’s drug policy” and “presented a milder tone to drug policy reform.”107 For his part, 
President Carter asked Congress to consider decriminalizing marijuana.108 Congress, 
however,  did not enact any legislation in response to President Carter’s request.109 
President Regan took office in 1981 and returned to the bellicose rhetoric that 
characterized the Nixon years. For instance, President Reagan criticized the policy of the 
Carter administration by explaining that he was “taking down the surrender flag …. 
[and] running up the battle flag.”110 President Reagan shifted the focus of national drug 
policy from treatment to enforcement and advocated zero-tolerance policies in the 
workplace, among other policies.111 President George H.W. Bush continued President 
Reagan’s drug policies, but increased the focus on law enforcement efforts.112 
Subsequent administrations continued to pour billions of dollars into the war on drugs, 
but policy differences did emerge as some administrations, for example, prioritized 
treatment over enforcement (Bill Clinton) or prioritized addressing consumer demand 
over efforts to cut off the supply of drugs (George W. Bush).113 
 
The hippies, once targeted by Nixon, grew up, got jobs, and presumably fell off the radar 
of law enforcement. This is not to say, however, that their appetite for marijuana 
dissipated. White professionals, even lawyers, have always been able to purchase and 




use marijuana without much fear of criminal recrimination. Even though marijuana 
usage rates are comparable across races, black and brown people have had different 
experiences with the criminal justice system when it comes to marijuana. For example, a 
2013 study conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union explained that “despite the 
fact that marijuana is used at comparable rates by whites and blacks, state and local 
governments have aggressively enforced marijuana laws selectively against Black people 
and communities.”114 The ACLU study found that a black person was 3.73 times more 
likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than a white person.115 Another report 
found that Blacks and Hispanics “make up twenty percent of the marijuana smokers in 
the United States but comprise 58% of marijuana offenders sentenced under federal law 
in 1995.”116 
 
The costs of enforcing drug laws have been staggering. Between 1970 and 2010, the U.S. 
spent $1 trillion on the war on drugs, including $121 billion to arrest more than 37 
million non-violent drug offenders, including those arrested for marijuana possession.117 
The U.S. currently spends more than $47 billion each year on the war on drugs.118 A 
2010 study from the libertarian Cato Institute found that in 2008, state and local 
governments spent a combined $5.4 billion (after accounting for offsetting fines and 
seizures) on enforcing marijuana prohibitions.119 According to that study, Illinois spent 
over $89 million on marijuana enforcement.120 
 
The massive expenditures at the federal and state level have done nothing to curb 
demand for marijuana. The 2013 ACLU report found that “[b]etween 2001 and 2010, 
there were 8,244,943 marijuana arrests, of which 7,295,880, or 88%, were for 
marijuana possession.”121 A 2018 article in the Federal Sentencing Reporter observed, 
“More than 10 million marijuana arrests, the vast majority for simple possession, have 
already been recorded nationwide in the twenty-first century.”122 The Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration estimated that 43.5 million Americans 
(15.9% of the population) used marijuana in 2018, this represented an increase from 
2002–2017.123 By any objective measure, the war on drugs, particularly marijuana, has 
been an absolute failure. 
 
President Obama entered the White House as the first chief executive in our history to 
publicly acknowledge smoking and inhaling marijuana recreationally.124 Despite 
acknowledging the legitimacy of a continued discussion about the utility of drug laws, 
President Obama explained, “I personally, and my administration’s position, is that 
legalization is not the answer.”125 The following year, President Obama’s Justice 
Department issued a memorandum (the so-called “Cole Memo”126) clarifying that the 
federal government would not prioritize criminal prosecution of citizens complying with 
the marijuana laws of their states.127 Many considered the Cole Memo to be a signal to 
the states that the Justice Department would not interfere with local efforts to legalize or 
decriminalize medical or recreational marijuana.128 On January 14, 2018, Attorney 
General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III rescinded the Cole Memo and reminded 
federal prosecutors that Congress had determined that “marijuana is a dangerous drug 
and marijuana activity is a serious crime.”129 Following the 2018 midterm elections, 
Sessions was unceremoniously replaced by William P. Barr, who announced that he 
would leave enforcement of marijuana laws to the states.130 





The growing unease, on both the political right131 and left,132 with the human and 
economic costs of the war on drugs fueled a legalization movement. Proponents of 
legalization cited the costs of the failed war on drugs, as well as the potential economic 
benefits that would come from legalization. The Cato Institute study found, using 2008 
numbers, that legalizing all drugs and imposing appropriate sin taxes on those drugs 
would save $41.3 billion a year in law-enforcement costs and generate $46.7 billion in 
annual tax revenues ($8.7 billion attributable to marijuana).133 Again using 2008 
numbers, the Cato Institute found that legal marijuana in Illinois would generate nearly 
$125 million in annual tax revenues.134 The lure of new tax revenue streams, particularly 
in the face of the exorbitant costs associated with the failed war on drugs, caused voters 
and politicians alike to embrace efforts to legalize marijuana. In 1996, California became 
the first state to legalize medical marijuana; it did so through a ballot initiative.135 In 
2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize recreational 
marijuana.136 Each state did this through a ballot initiative, rather than through the 
legislative process.137 President Obama responded to the legalization initiatives in 
Colorado and Washington by explaining, “[I]t’s important for it to go forward because 
it’s important for society not to have a situation in which a large portion of people have 
at one time or another broken the law and only a select few get punished.”138 Currently, 
33 states (including Illinois) have legalized medical marijuana; recreational marijuana 
has been legalized by 11 states (including Illinois) and the District of Columbia. New 
York and New Jersey are expected to join the list of eleven soon.139 Illinois was the first 
state to legalize marijuana through the legislative process.140 There is currently 
bipartisan legislation pending in Congress, the Strengthening the Tenth Amendment 
through Entrusting States (STATES) Act, that would protect states that have legalized 
marijuana from intervention from the federal government.141  
 
Illinois liberalized its drug laws in response to unacceptable outcomes in our criminal 
justice system, not unacceptable outcomes in the workplace. This is not to say that an 
employee discharged for violating a workplace drug policy ever considered that outcome 
acceptable or just. Rather, this is to say that changes in state drug laws were not 
intended as a reform of labor and employment laws. The General Assembly specifically 
attempted to preserve the status quo in the workplace, while at the same time legalizing 
marijuana for medical and recreational use. Whether the status quo can or should be 
preserved is a question addressed below.   
 
IV. MEDICAL MARIJUANA IN ILLINOIS  
 
On January 1, 2014, the Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act 
(“Medical Cannabis Act”) went into effect in Illinois.142  The Medical Cannabis Act 
allows qualifying patients to use cannabis without being subject to arrest, prosecution, 
or property forfeiture.143 In enacting the law, the General Assembly specifically found 
that “[c]annabis has many currently accepted medical uses in the United States, having 
been recommended by thousands of licensed physicians to at least 600,000 patients in 
states with medical cannabis laws.”144 The legislature further found that “medical 
research has confirmed the beneficial uses of cannabis in treating or alleviating the pain, 
nausea, and other symptoms associated with a variety of debilitating medical conditions, 




including cancer, multiple sclerosis, and HIV/AIDS . . .”145 As explained above, one of 
the rationales given by Congress for banning Schedule I drugs, including marijuana, was 
that such drugs had “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States.”146 At least with respect to marijuana, the federal and state legislative findings 
are at odds with one another. 
 
Notably, the General Assembly’s certitude is not present in the scientific community. To 
date, “[m]arijuana has no officially recognized health benefits according to the [FDA] 
and more than twenty leading medical and scientific organizations,”147 including the 
National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine, American Academy of Family 
Physicians, American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, American College of Physicians, and the American Medical 
Association.148 One commentator has explained, “an absence of FDA approval does not 
prove that marijuana is ineffective or unsafe.”149 Instead, “[i]t simply means that the 
benefits and risks of the drug have not been studied sufficiently to meet FDA standards, 
and the risk/benefit ratio is therefore undetermined.”150 As the National Academy of 
Medicine explained in a 2017 report, “very little is known about the efficacy, dose, routes 
of administration, or side effects of commonly used and commercially available 
cannabis products in the United States.”151 
 
There is, to be sure, anecdotal evidence from both patients and physicians to suggest 
that marijuana is effective for treating epilepsy, Parkinson’s disease, Tourette’s 
syndrome and glaucoma. There is also “good-quality research” (though not sufficient to 
meet FDA standards) suggesting that marijuana may be beneficial for ameliorating 
chronic neuropathic or cancer pain, and spasticity associated with neurological 
disorders like multiple sclerosis.152 We simply do not have the rigorous research from 
the scientific community that usually precedes a change in public policy. This paper has 
argued that legalization was a direct response to unacceptable outcomes in the criminal 
justice system. It is difficult to imagine that any state, including Illinois, would have 
legalized medical marijuana with such an underdeveloped body of scientific research if 
it had not been part of a broader plan of criminal justice reform. Drug laws in this 
country have always been driven by politics, not science, and the recent reforms in 
Illinois are no exception. 
 
Although the Medical Cannabis Act legalized the use of medical marijuana, the law 
preserved employers’ rights to administer drug tests, enforce zero-tolerance policies 
and/or maintain drug free workplaces.153 And, in an acknowledgment of existing federal 
laws, the Medical Cannabis Act provided, “Nothing in this Act shall limit and employer’s 
ability to discipline an employee for failing a drug test if failing to do so would put the 
employer in violation of federal law or cause it lose a federal contract or funding.”154 
Thus, for an employer with an ideological commitment to a drug-free workplace or 
otherwise subject to federal regulations, the Medical Cannabis Act did little to alter the 
treatment of marijuana in the workplace. Put another way, employees subject to 
workplace drug policies will not be able to use medical marijuana without facing 
repercussions in the form of workplace discipline, despite passage of the Medical 
Cannabis Act. Initially enacted as a “pilot program,” the Cannabis Act became 
permanent in 2019.155 





No Illinois court has ruled on whether a valid medical marijuana patient may be 
disciplined or discharged for using marijuana outside of the workplace.156 Courts in 
other jurisdictions have held, however, that similarly structured medical marijuana laws 
were not intended to alter the employment relationship. For example, in Casias v. Wal-
Mart,157 the Sixth Circuit held that holding a medical marijuana card was not a defense 
to disciplinary action taken by a private employer against an employee for failing a drug 
test. The court found the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act was intended to protect 
users from state action and was not intended to regulate private employment.158 The 
Sixth Circuit agreed with district court’s finding that “private employees are not 
protected from disciplinary action as a result of their use of medical marijuana, nor are 
private employers required to accommodate the use of medical marijuana in the 
workplace.”159 
 
Similarly, in Coles v. Harris Teeter, LLC,160 an at-will employee covered by Washington 
D.C.’s medical marijuana law was terminated upon failing a drug test. The court 
explained that it could not ascertain a “clear policy mandate in the District’s law that an 
employer must accept an employee’s lawful marijuana use.”161 Instead, the district court 
observed that the statute at issue in that case, as well as similar statutes in other states, 
“legalized the use of marijuana for certain medical purposes, but did not otherwise 
explicitly mandate that employers must tolerate that use.”162 
 
Finally, in Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., the California Supreme Court 
in a 5–2 decision ruled that it was not going to impose obligations on private employers 
with respect to the state’s medical marijuana law, explaining that “[n]othing in the text 
or history of the [state medical marijuana law] suggests the voters intended the measure 
to address the respective rights and duties of employers and employees.”163 These cases 
demonstrate that courts have allowed employers to enforce otherwise reasonable drug 
policies, notwithstanding medical marijuana laws. Based on the structure of the Illinois 
Medical Cannabis Act, it is hard to imagine an Illinois court analyzing a termination 
case brought by a user of medical marijuana any differently. 
 
The passage of medical marijuana laws may have legalized marijuana usage in certain 
contexts and made marijuana more widely available for patients, but it appears not to 
have had much of an impact on the workplace. Although the above cases appear 
correctly decided as a matter of statutory construction, the outcomes are troubling from 
the plaintiffs’ perspectives and highlight one of the difficulties in managing medical 
marijuana laws going forward. The plaintiffs in the above cases were all terminated for 
using lawful medical marijuana. Most state marijuana laws were passed on ballot 
initiates and generated tremendous attention in the press. Individual employees are, of 
course, responsible for knowing the requirements of their jobs, including all workplace 
policies. But as a practical matter, it is not unreasonable for an employee who voted in a 
successful ballot initiative and later obtained the proper credentials for a medical 
marijuana card to conclude that the new state law trumped any workplace drug policy. 
The discharged employee in such a scenario looks different (in the terms of intent, 
culpability, etc.) than an employee facing discharge for violating a drug policy prior to 
the passage of a state medical or recreational marijuana law. Going forward, it is 




imperative that unions and employers explain the relationship between state 
legalization efforts and workplace policies to avoid a situation where an employee 
complies with state law, but nevertheless finds herself in violation of an employer’s drug 
policy. 
 
V. THE OPIATE EPIDEMIC AND THE ILLINOIS ALTERNATIVE TO 
OPIODS ACT OF 2018 
 
The opioid epidemic has plagued the United States. Barbara Fedders explains: “Opioids 
are a class of drugs that include pain relievers available legally by prescription, such as 
oxycodone, marketed as OxyContin; hydrocodone, marketed as Vicodin; codeine; 
morphine; the illegal drug heroin; and synthetic products such as fentanyl and 
carfentanil.”164 “Each is chemically related and interacts with opioid receptors on nerve 
cells in the body and brain, producing pain relief and euphoria.” 165 According to Dr. 
Zeez N. Kain, “consistent consumption of drugs like Hydrocodone and Oxycodone leads 
to increased tolerance and a condition called hyperalgesia, which is increased sensitivity 
to pain after long term intake of pain medication.”166 “Those consequences, in turn, 
require more pain medication for the patient and dependency develops before the drugs 
were ever technically abused.” 167 
 
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration “estimated that 10.3 
million people aged 12 and older misused opioids in the past year, including 9.9 million 
prescription pain reliever misusers and 808,000 heroin users.”168 The same survey also 
estimated that 2 million people aged 12 or older had an opioid use disorder in 2018.169 
Tragically, the CDC reports that opioid overdoses continue to claim an average of 128 
American lives each day.170 
 
Illinois was not immune from this plague. In 2018, Illinois enacted the Alternative to 
Opioids Act of 2018 (“Opioids Act”). The Opioids Act, passed as an amendment to the 
Medical Cannabis Act, cited specific findings from the Illinois Opioid Action Plan, 
released in September of 2017.171 The Action Plan characterized “[t]he opioid epidemic 
[as] the most significant public health and public safety crisis facing Illinois.”172 It 
further found that “drug overdoses have now become the leading cause of death 
nationwide for people under the age of 50” and estimated that opioid overdoses killed 
nearly 11,000 Illinois residents between 2008 and 2018.173 At current rates, the Action 
Plan predicted “the opioid epidemic will claim the lives of more than 2,700 Illinoisans in 
2020.”174 The Action Plan attributed the  increase in opioid deaths to “the dramatic rise 
in the rate and amount of opioids prescribed for pain over the past decades.”175 
 
The Opioid Act extended the lawful use of medical marijuana to qualifying participants 
in an Opioid Alternative Pilot Program who have medical conditions “for which an 
opioid has been or could be prescribed by a certifying health care professional based on 
generally accepted standards of care.”176 Several studies have found that cancer patients 
using marijuana needed fewer opioid painkillers.177 In addition, opioid-related deaths 
have declined in states that have legalized medical marijuana.178 But a study published 
in the American Journal of Psychiatry found “cannabis use, even among adults with 
moderate to severe pain, was associated with a substantially increased risk of 




nonmedical prescription opioid use at 3-year follow-up.”179 The authors of the study 
explained that “a strong prospective association between cannabis and opioid use 
disorder should nevertheless sound a note of caution in ongoing policy discussions 
concerning cannabis and in clinical debate over authorization of medical marijuana to 
reduce nonmedical use of prescription opioids and fatal opioid overdoses.”180 
 
Although it is not clear that medical marijuana will reverse any of the alarming trends 
associated with the opioids, one thing is clear: there is no known case of human death by 
cannabis poisoning.181 Thus, from a public health perspective, marijuana is an 
objectively less dangerous option for pain management than opioids. There is, of course, 
a certain irony that after a fifty-year war on drugs, a Schedule I narcotic historically 
peddled by street-level drug dealers is being promoted by our legislature as an 
alternative to physician-prescribed Schedule II opiates. In any event, for individuals 
affected by the opiate crisis, any relief is welcome. 
 
Because the provisions of the Opioid Act are integrated into the existing Cannabis Act, 
all the employer protections, including the right to administer drug testing and enforce a 
zero tolerance policies and/or drug free workplaces182 apply to an individual/employee 
who wishes to take advantage of the new law and transition from an opioid to 
marijuana. Swapping marijuana for an opioid raises a serious issue for an employee 
subject to DOT regulations or a zero-tolerance drug policy. Notwithstanding the well-
documented dangers of opioids, employees are usually able to use physician-prescribed 
opioids (when not working) without implicating DOT regulations or even an employer’s 
zero-tolerance drug policy. Transitioning from an opioid to medical marijuana may be 
prudent from a public or personal health perspective, but for an employee with a CDL or 
subject to a zero-tolerance workplace policy, such a transition may result in a positive 
drug test and place her job in jeopardy. Whether using marijuana while off duty as a 
substitute for an opioid could be considered a “reasonable accommodation” under the 
Illinois Human Rights Act is beyond the scope of this paper, but is a plausible argument 
that could be asserted on behalf of an employee seeking to transition. For now, the 
Opioids Act effectively allows an employer to veto an employee’s decision to transition 
from opioids to marijuana, thereby minimizing the possible benefits of the legislation.  
  
VI. RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA IN ILLINOIS 
  
On July 29, 2016, Illinois became the twenty-first state to decriminalize the possession 
of small amounts of marijuana.183 On January 1, 2020, the Illinois Cannabis Regulation 
and Tax Act (“Recreational Cannabis Act”) went into effect and Illinois became the 
eleventh state to legalize recreational marijuana. 184 The Recreational Cannabis Act 
seeks to regulate cannabis “in a manner similar to alcohol…”185 Accordingly, the 
legislature eliminated criminal penalties for the possession and personal use of defined 
amounts of cannabis flower, cannabis-infused product, and cannabis concentrate for 
Illinois residents 21 years of age or older186 and established a plan for the distribution 
and taxation of cannabis.187 Despite allowing the personal use of cannabis, the 
Recreational Cannabis Act specifically provides that employers are not required to 
“allow employees to use or be under the influence of cannabis in the workplace or while 
on call”188 and sets forth “specific, articulable symptoms” that evidence impairment.189 




The statute also expressly permits employers to adopt “reasonable” zero-tolerance or 
drug-free workplace policies, including drug testing, and allows an employer to 
discipline or terminate employees for violating such policies.190 Employers must, 
however, afford employees “a reasonable opportunity to contest the determination” of 
impairment if it leads to discipline.191 
 
Upon passing the Recreational Cannabis Act, the General Assembly amended the 
Illinois Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act (“Privacy Act”) to provide, “[e]xcept as 
otherwise specifically provided by law, including Section 10-50 of the Cannabis 
Regulation and Tax Act . . . , it shall be unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise disadvantage any individual, with respect to 
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges or employment because the individual 
uses lawful products off the premises of the employer during non-working and non-call 
hours.”192 The term “lawful products” is specifically defined as “legal under state law.”193 
The Recreational Cannabis Act also insulates employers from some employee lawsuits. 
Specifically, the Act provides: 
 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create or imply a cause of action 
for any person against an employer … for actions taken pursuant to an 
employer’s reasonable drug policy, including but not limited to subjecting 
an employee or applicant to reasonable drug and alcohol testing, 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory random drug testing, and discipline, 
termination of employment, or withdrawal of a job offer due to a failure of 
a drug test . . . 194  
 
This language was added to the legislation shortly before the law went into effect at the 
urging of the management community.195  
 
A. Consumer Demand for Legal and Illegal Marijuana 
 
In the first month following the enactment of the Recreational Cannabis Act, Illinois 
residents spent $30.6 million on recreational marijuana; out-of-state residents spent an 
additional $8.6 million—bringing total first month sales to $39.2 million.196 These 
strong first month sales generated cannabis tax revenue in the amount of $7.3 million 
and sales tax revenue in the amount of $3.1 million.197 The high consumer demand dried 
up supply and even forced some dispensaries to close.198 Shortages are expected for 
months.199 Annual recreational marijuana sales are expected to generate anywhere from 
$500 million200 to $1.6 billion201 in revenue and millions of dollars in annual tax 
revenues.202 In fact, the Illinois Department of Revenue forecasts initial tax revenues of 
$34 million in 2020, climbing to $375.5 million in 2024.203  
 
B. Marijuana in Illinois 
 
Illinois may have legalized marijuana, but it did not eliminate unlawful marijuana. 
Marijuana purchased at legal Illinois dispensaries is subject to state excise taxes ranging 
between 10% and 25% (based on THC content), in addition to general state sales tax of 
6.25% and local sales taxes as high as 4.75%—resulting in purchase prices twice as much 




as the those paid on the illegal, secondary market.204 Some large Illinois communities, 
including Mount Prospect, Arlington Heights, and Naperville, have also exercised their 
right to “opt out” and ban recreational sales.205 Illegal drug markets rarely encounter 
shortages and drug dealers do not “opt out” of servicing individual communities. The 
combination of higher prices, supply problems and out-right bans will allow the black 
market to persist in Illinois. Notably, black markets thrived in California and Colorado 
even after those states legalized marijuana.206 A recent article in the New York Times 
observed that “despite legalization of marijuana in more states—arrests for drugs 
increased again last year.”207 Black markets sales will continue, and one would expect 
arrests at point of sale and/or for possession of illegally purchased marijuana to 
continue, notwithstanding legalization and decriminalization.   
 
C. Marijuana and the Workplace  
 
Even though none of the recent changes in drug laws at the federal and state levels were 
intended to reform labor and employment laws, the impact of these legislative changes 
will be felt most immediately and acutely in the workplace. As a result of widely 
available legal CBD and marijuana, more employees will be coming to work with THC in 
their systems. This will present novel issues for employers in safety-sensitive industries 
requiring drug-free employees, as well as employers in non-safety sensitive industries 
that nevertheless demand workers to remain drug-free.  
 
As explained above, a common drug test often mistakes CBD for THC.208  In addition, 
the DEA tells us that “all extracts that contain CBD will also contain at least small 
amounts of other cannabinoids.”209 A small amount of the other most common 
cannabinoid in hemp (THC) revealed on a drug test is  enough to violate a zero-
tolerance policy. In detecting a small amount of TCH, a drug test cannot determine 
whether that small amount of THC is the residual of a larger amount of marijuana 
ingested days or weeks earlier or simply the small amount accompanying the larger CBD 
product used more recently. The JAMA study cited above found most CBD products are 
not labeled properly and detected TCH levels sufficient to product intoxication or 
impairment in 20% of the CBD products tested.210 For all these reasons, an employee 
who is otherwise respectful of an employer’s zero-tolerance policy has a reasonable 
chance of failing a drug test upon taking a lawful CBD product. 
 
The availability of unregulated CBD products that likely contain some amounts of THC 
will make zero-tolerance policies difficult to administer. An employer with a zero-
tolerance policy will find itself on the horns of a dilemma if faced with an employee who 
has failed a drug test after taking a falsely-labeled CBD product. Discipline seems 
unwarranted, unnecessarily punitive and lacking in just cause. Yet creating an exception 
for CBD products will likely undermine an entire policy, as any self-respecting 
marijuana user subject to a zero-tolerance policy will likely have ample supplies of CBD 
products to present in the event of a failed drug test. Difficult choices like these may 
prompt some employers to reconsider the value of maintaining zero-tolerance policies 
or the consequences of failing a drug test. As explained, above, even the DOT regulations 
do not require discipline upon a failed drug test. Instead, the regulations only require an 
employer to remove an employee from a safety-sensitive position until that employee 




passes a return-to-duty test.211 The increasing popularity of unregulated CBD may cause 
employers to consider severing discipline from drug testing, or at least 
reconceptualizing discipline as it relates to drug testing. 
 
Despite legalization, employees will continue to buy, sell, and use illegally obtained 
marijuana, and drug arrests may actually increase.212 In the past, drug arrests and 
convictions often spilled over into the workplace, leading to discipline for off-duty 
conduct and union grievances in response. These cases will also likely continue, 
although the criminal penalties in cases involving possession of small amounts of 
marijuana may not be as severe in the wake of decriminalization. Arbitrators reviewing 
discipline for off-duty conduct typically require a showing of a “nexus” between the off-
duty conduct and an employer’s legitimate business interest.213 In drug cases, this is 
often established by showing that the off-duty conduct could seriously damage an 
employer’s public image or that the conduct makes it impossible for supervisors or co-
workers to deal with the employee.214 After the passage of the Recreational Cannabis 
Act, an off-duty case involving a marijuana arrest looks more like a tax avoidance case 
than a traditional drug crime. Whether an employer will be able to establish the 
requisite nexus in such cases will depend on the specific facts of the case, but the 
existence of the Recreational Cannabis Act will make it more difficult to establish an 
injury to an employer’s reputation or co-worker backlash. 
 
The Recreational Cannabis Act envisions treating marijuana “in a manner similar to 
alcohol”215 and does not require employers to tolerate employees who are “under the 
influence of cannabis in the workplace or while on call.”216 There is an obvious appeal to 
thinking about marijuana in the same way we think about alcohol. The difficulty, of 
course, is with the ability to test real-time impairment of individuals suspected of being 
under the influence of marijuana. This will prove to be one of the biggest issues for 
employers willing to allow off-duty marijuana usage but demanding workplace sobriety. 
Currently available drug tests reveal use, not impairment; such tests “cannot ascertain 
the quantity of a drug consumed, the time of consumption, or its effect on the user.”217 
The best available tests can only establish that a person has used marijuana in the last 
few days.218 Until tests for real-time impairment are available, employers will be forced 
to rely on subjective factors in evaluating employees for workplace impairment.219 
 
Discipline based on subjective evaluations will almost certainly be challenged through 
union grievance procedures. These cases will ultimately end up in arbitration where the 
employers will have the burden under the traditional just cause standard to prove 
impairment through testimony from decision-makers about their subjective evaluations 
of the grievant.  Cases based on subjective evaluations are always difficult, but this new 
category of cases will prove even more difficult considering the range of THC content 
available today. Malcom Gladwell observed in The New Yorker that “[b]ecause of recent 
developments in plant breeding and growing techniques, the typical concentration of 
THC … has gone from the low single digits (in the 1980s and 1990s) to more than twenty 
percent—from a swig of near-beer to a tequila shot.”220 Writing in the New York Times, 
two physicians explained, “[i]n the early 1990s, the average THC content for confiscated 
marijuana was roughly 3.7 percent. By contrast, a recent analysis of marijuana for sale 
in Colorado’s authorized dispensaries showed an average THC content of 18.7 




percent.”221 High potency strains of marijuana contain THC levels as high as 28 
percent.222 
 
An employee using marijuana with low THC content before or during work will likely 
exhibit behaviors vastly different from an employee using marijuana with high THC 
content. The variability in THC levels will make it difficult for employers to standardize 
evaluation criteria. The Supreme Court teaches us that labor arbitrators are usually 
chosen because of their “knowledge of the common law of the shop.”223 Arbitrators have 
no particular expertise in determining impairment after-the-fact. Arbitrators, as well as 
labor and management advocates, will have to learn how to evaluate claims of 
impairment in response to a new category of grievances created by the Recreational 
Cannabis Act and modern growing techniques.  
 
Congress and the General Assembly legalized CBD and marijuana, respectively, without 
giving much thought about how these laws will affect the workplace. Even though CBD 
and marijuana will affect the workplace, the precise impact is unknown at this point. 
This Article has identified a few areas that may be affected by these new laws, but this 
analysis is by no means intended to be exhaustive. In fact, one would expect legal CBD 
and marijuana will affect the workplace in ways not contemplated by Congress, the 
General Assembly, or this Article.  Practitioners now find themselves in uncharted 
waters. 
      
D. Pre-Employment Testing 
 
The management bar applauded the General Assembly’s eleventh-hour decision to 
strengthen employer protections in the marijuana legislation.224 In explaining the new 
law to clients and potential clients, several management firms have taken aggressive 
positions on pre-employment, post-offer drug testing. Two management lawyers 
believe, for example: “These amendments [to the Recreational Cannabis Act] make clear 
that employers may continue pre-employment drug testing and, to the extent 
permissible by the employer’s policy, withdraw offers of employment to employees who 
tested positive for cannabis use . . . ”225 There are at least two problems with this 
assertion. 
 
First, no Illinois court has considered the issue of pre-employment, post-offer drug 
testing since the recent passage of the statute. Expressing certitude about an eventual 
interpretation of a new statute is dangerous.226 Second, on the merits, the law does not 
seem that clear to warrant such certainty. As explained above, the Privacy Act provides, 
in relevant part, “except as provided in Section 10-50 of the Cannabis Regulation and 
Tax Act it shall be unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire… any individual… because 
the individual uses lawful products . . . ” 
 
Sections 10-50 (a) through (c) provide that nothing in the Act: (a) prohibits an employer 
from adopting reasonable policies concerning the use of cannabis in the workplace; (b) 
requires an employer to permit an employee to be under the influence in the workplace; 
or (c) limits or prevents an employer from disciplining or terminating an employee for 
violating an employer’s workplace drug policy.227 Absent from this section of the statute 




is any language suggesting that an employer may withdraw a job offer based on a 
positive drug test. Given the structure of the statute, if the legislature intended to permit 
the withdrawal of post-testing job offers, one would have expected language to the effect 
of “nothing in the Act limits or prevents and employer from withdrawing a job offer if an 
employee tests positive for marijuana on pre-employment drug test.” The statute does 
not say this. 
 
Section 10-50(e)(1) of the Recreational Cannabis Act does, however, provide, “[n]othing 
in this Act shall be construed to create or imply a cause of action for any person against 
an employer for: . . . withdrawal of a job offer . . . due to a failure of a drug test.”228 
Importantly, a cause of action in response to a withdrawal of job offering following a 
positive drug would likely be brought under the Privacy Act, not the Recreational 
Cannabis Act. For its part, Section 15(c) of the Privacy Act provides, “If an employer or 
prospective employer violates this Act, an employee or applicant for employment may 
commence an action in the circuit court to enforce the provisions of this Act . . . ”229 And, 
Section 10-50(f) of the Recreational Cannabis Act provides, “[n]othing in this Act shall 
be construed to enhance or diminish protections afforded by any other law . . . ”230 
 
The question for Illinois courts will be whether the language in Section 10-50(e)(1) of 
the Recreational Cannabis Act (i.e., “nothing in this Act shall be construed to create or 
imply a cause of action for any person against an employer for: . . . withdrawal of a job 
offer due to a failure of a drug test) trumps Section 15 of the Privacy Act which creates a 
private right of action against a prospective employer that refuses to hire an employee 
because she used a lawful product. To defeat a claim brought under the Privacy Act, a 
prospective employer will have to persuade a court that the cause of action was, in fact, 
“created” by the Recreational Cannabis Act, not the Privacy Act. The answer to this 
question is not as clear as some management firms have suggested. In harmonizing the 
two statutes, a court could reasonably find that an employer violates the Privacy Act if it 
withdraws a job offer because a prospective employee fails a pre-employment drug test. 
Particularly since an employer may, under the Recreational Cannabis Act, clearly 
enforce a zero-tolerance policy, the better approach in such a case may be for the 
employer to follow through on the offer of employment, but advise the employee of the 
employer’s policies and counsel the employee that future marijuana use will not be 
tolerated.  
 
By taking an aggressive approach to pre-employment drug tests, employers will find that 
they are excluding otherwise qualified candidates from the hiring process. Objective 
evidence reveals that Americans have a growing appetite for marijuana. The 2013 ACLU 
report discussed above found over 7 million people were arrested for marijuana 
possession between 2001 and 2010.231 These were only the people who were caught. The 
study from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration discussed 
above estimated that 43.5 million Americans (15.9% of the population) used marijuana 
in 2018.232 Although estimated use rates were highest among people aged 18 to 25 
(34.8%), 28.5 million (13.3%) adults aged 26 or older used marijuana in 2018.233 This 
represented an increase from 2002–2017.234 Eight million people reportedly use 
marijuana every day.235 These numbers on usage help explain the nearly $40 million in 
first month marijuana sales in Illinois. Many people use this drug and usage rates in 




Illinois will likely continue to increase with the passage of the Recreational Cannabis 
Act. Putting aside the question of whether it is lawful to withdraw a job offer following a 
positive drug test, it seems irrational for an employer to exclude so many people from 
the hiring process simply because they may have used or are using marijuana. Indeed, it 
is hard to imagine an employer implementing any policy that would systematically 
exclude 13% to 35% of working-age adults from the hiring process, yet this would be the 
effect of a rigid drug policy that relies on pre-employment drug screening. 
 
Employers are always on much firmer ground regulating on-duty employee conduct, as 
opposed to off-duty conduct. As explained above, to sustain the discipline for off-duty 
conduct, arbitrators typically require employers to establish a nexus between the alleged 
conduct and an employer’s legitimate interest. The idea that an employer could regulate 
pre-employment, lawful conduct by rescinding a job offer following a pre-employment 
drug test seems to stretch existing doctrine too far.  Using existing doctrine as a guide, it 
is difficult to imagine what interest an employer could articulate that could justify the 
rescission of an offer of employment upon learning than an employee used lawful 
marijuana while unemployed, for example. From a policy perspective, even someone 
opposed to employees using marijuana while off-duty might concede that a period of 
unemployment is an appropriate time for a person to use lawful marijuana. A person 
whose job offer has just been rescinded may not have recourse to a collectively 
bargained grievance procedure and arbitration, but that same person would present as a 
sympathetic plaintiff in a suit brought under the Privacy Act in a case of first impression 
to test the limits of the new legislation.      
           
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Marijuana was never as dangerous as Congress declared in passing the CSA and it is 
likely not the risk-free wonder drug that some advocates of medical marijuana have 
posited. Legalization efforts at the state level may eventually pressure Congress to 
reclassify marijuana on the CSA schedule. Until that happens people will continue to use 
marijuana for medicinal purposes under the cover of state law. People will also continue 
to use CBD products, often purchased online, to address a host of ailments. As people 
learn more about the dangers associated with opioids, patients may also turn to medical 
marijuana for post-surgery relief instead of filling initial prescriptions for opioids. 
Patients already taking an opioid may attempt to wean themselves by transitioning to 
medical marijuana. And with the recent passage of the Recreational Cannabis Act, many 
people (both veteran and new users) will use marijuana without fear of arrest or 
prosecution. All of this is to say that because of the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill at the 
federal level, and the Medical Marijuana Act and the Recreational Cannabis Act in 
Illinois, THC is now a lawful part of the lives of many Illinois residents—many of whom 
also happen to be employees. 
 
Despite legalizing medical and recreational marijuana in the main, the General 
Assembly preserved the right of employers to enforce their own drug policies. Under 
this framework, non-employees (students, retirees, etc.) may use marijuana for medical 
or recreational purposes without incident or repercussion. Employees, on the other 
hand, may only use marijuana without consequence if their employer does not maintain 




and enforce a drug policy. At least with respect to working adults, the legislature has 
essentially outsourced state drug policy to management in the non-union setting and to 
labor and management in the unionized setting.236 In the past labor and management 
could avoid the issue of marijuana in the workplace by hiding behind state and federal 
laws that criminalized the drug—workplace prohibitions on marijuana usage were 
justified because marijuana was illegal. That cover is now gone. Labor and management 
must now wrestle with the issue and find solutions that match the realities of the 
workplace. It will now be up to employers and unions to decide the permissible limits of 
marijuana usage for employees. One would expect a public works contract to deal with 
marijuana differently than a contract covering custodians, for example. 
 
There will be little debate that workplace impairment (from drugs or alcohol) is 
unacceptable. Policing workplace marijuana impairment will be difficult, however, until 
affordable, reliable, real-time testing becomes available. Off-duty employee marijuana 
usage presents an even more difficult issue for employers. The General Assembly 
preserved employers’ right to maintain zero-tolerance policies but created conditions 
that will make it impossible for employers to maintain the status quo. Legalization 
created a new consumer market and consumer demand for marijuana is high. 
Furthermore, the legalization of CBD at the federal level means that non-marijuana 
using employees will have THC in their systems, which will be detectable on drug tests. 
Positive test results for non-marijuana using employees will undermine the legitimacy of 
drug testing or result in unwarranted discipline—both of which are bad outcomes. 
 
Macroeconomic conditions will ultimately pressure Illinois employers to liberalize or 
eliminate existing drug policies. Illinois legalized marijuana at a time of historically low 
unemployment rates; in January 2020 the unemployment rate in Illinois was 3.5%.237  
Prior to the economic collapse caused by COVID-19, many employers reported 
shortages of skilled workers in the labor market.238 In 2018 the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics estimated there were only 6.4 million workers available to fill 6.7 million open 
positions.239  Labor shortages were particularly acute in the public sector.240 On March 
21, 2020, Illinois shut down non-essential portions of its economy in response to 
COVID-19, 241 causing an immediate spike in unemployment rates.  As of April 2020, the 
unemployment rate in Illinois was 16.4%.242   At the time of this writing, many states, 
including Illinois, have instituted plans to reopen their economies.243  It is doubtful 
Illinois will return to historically low unemployment rates any time soon and it is 
unclear how Illinois’s economy will ultimately respond to this health crisis.  It is clear, 
however, that certain industries will fare better than others.  Many employees in 
industries deemed “essential”—including construction, health care, food production, 
distribution, utilities, critical trades, public safety, transportation, etc.244-- remained 
working through the early days of the crisis and will continue to do so. Illinois’s 
unemployment rate will likely remain high in the short run, but tight labor market 
conditions will continue in essential industries. 
 
In early 2020, before the first reported U.S. death caused by COVID-19, the General 
Assembly’s decision to legalize marijuana was the topic de jure for practitioners. On 
May 27, 2020, the U.S. reached the grim milestone of 100,000 reported deaths caused 
by COVID-19.245 That number will continue to increase. This health crisis highlights the 




insignificance of most of the issues (including legalized marijuana) that advocates for 
labor and management debate so vigorously in this publication, at conferences and 
across the bargaining table. The crisis will hopefully end soon with as little more human 
and economic damage as possible.  And one day we will return to debating the more 
mundane issues of labor and employment law, including the General Assembly’s 
decision to legalize marijuana. 
 
When that day comes, we will see that employers in safety-sensitive industries will have 
little choice but to maintain restrictions on marijuana usage. Outside of safety-sensitive 
industries, however, employers will find that rigid drug policies will be difficult to 
administer and will diminish the pool of qualified candidates in the hiring process 
and/or threaten existing relationships with skilled employees. In contrast, employers 
that do not restrict off-duty marijuana usage may find that the absence of restrictions 
will be viewed by some applicants and employees as a benefit which can be exploited for 
purposes of recruitment and retention. In the long run, the labor market will be the final 
arbiter of whether employers in non-safety sensitive industries will be able to maintain 
rigid workplace drug policies.  
 
The legislature allowed employers to maintain the status quo, but the costs of 
maintaining rigid drug policies will likely be too high for Illinois employers. Employers 
in non-safety sensitive industries opposed to off-duty marijuana use may not fully 
appreciate it as yet, but in due time their employees will join the ranks of millions of 
other employees across the state who use medical and recreational marijuana without 
consequence in the workplace. Marijuana’s “long, strange trip”246 may be coming to an 
end in Illinois, but the journey for labor and employment lawyers has just begun as we 
all struggle to understand employment in a state where marijuana is no longer verboten 
and where employees begin or continue using marijuana and CBD products for 
medicinal and recreational purposes. Marijuana is legal in Illinois. Rigid employer drug 
policies will now go up in smoke. 
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I. IELRA Developments 
 
A. Arbitration  
In Western Illinois University v. IELRB, 2020 IL App (4th) 190143(4th Dist. Apr. 10, 
2020), the Fourth District Appellate Court held that an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to 
determine whether an employer complied with the arbitrator’s award, even though the 
arbitrator had retained jurisdiction in the award to resolve disputes with respect to 
implementation of the remedy. The court reversed an IELRB determination that the 
University had violated section 14(a)(8) of the IELRA when it failed to comply with the 
arbitrator’s supplemental award. 
Due to declining enrollment, Western Illinois University (WIU) laid off several faculty. 
The Union grieved the layoffs and the arbitrator sustained the grievance with respect to 
two faculty members, finding that WIU violated the contractual requirement that it 
make reasonable efforts to locate other equivalent employment within the university for 
them. The arbitrator awarded that WIU make such efforts and retained jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes over implementation of the award. Subsequently, WIU notified the two 
faculty members that it was unable to find equivalent employment for them. The Union 
then moved to invoke the arbitrator’s retained jurisdiction. Over WIU’s objection, the 
arbitrator convened a second hearing and found that WIU failed to comply with the first 
award and awarded additional remedies. WIU refused to comply with the second award.  
The IELRB held that the second award was binding and ordered WIU to comply.  
The court held that the question of whether a party has complied with an arbitration 
award falls within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the IELRB. Consequently, the 
court opined, the arbitrator lacked authority to determine whether WIU complied with 
the first award. The court distinguished arbitrator retention of jurisdiction to correct 
errors and clarify ambiguities in an award from jurisdiction to determine compliance. 
The court further held that the arbitrator lacked contractual authority to decide whether 
WIU had complied with the first award. The court observed that the collective 
bargaining agreement provided “that ‘[a]rbitration shall be confined solely to the 
application and/or interpretation of [the CBA] and the precise issues submitted for 




arbitration” and that the arbitrator “shall have no authority to determine any other 
issue(s).’” (Emphasis provided by the court.)  The court continued: 
[The contract] could have simply stated that “arbitration shall be confined to the 
application and/or interpretation of [the CBA] and the issue submitted to 
arbitration,” but the actual sentence says much more. By including the modifiers 
“solely” and “precise” in that sentence, the CBA makes clear that the scope of the 
arbitrator's powers must be construed narrowly, not broadly. To conclude 
otherwise would render the addition of those modifiers meaningless. And if the 
presence of those modifiers were somehow not adequate to get this message 
across, the very next sentence of article 6.12(b) of the CBA makes the meaning of 
that article clear by stating the following: “The arbitrator shall have no authority 
to determine any other issue(s).” (Emphasis in original.) 
The court viewed the precise issue submitted to the arbitrator as whether WIU complied 
with the contractual layoff procedures.  According to the court, the arbitrator’s first 
award finding that WIU had not complied with those procedures was within the 
arbitrator’s authority but the second award, finding that WIU had not complied with the 
first award, was outside the scope of that authority.  The court remanded the case to the 
IELRB, instructing the IELRB to determine whether WIU complied with the first award. 
B. Exclusive Representation and Union Membership 
In Bennett v. AFSCME Council 31, 2020 WL 1549603 (C.D. Ill. March 31, 2020), the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois upheld the constitutionality of the 
IELRA’s provision that a union selected by the majority of employees in a bargaining 
unit is the exclusive representative of all unit employees.  The court also held 
constitutional the collection of union dues from a bargaining unit member despite her 
claim that she would not have joined the union had she known that she could not 
constitutionally be required to pay a fair share fee. 
Susan Bennett was a custodian for the Moline-Coal Valley School District No. 40 and 
was represented by AFSCME Local 672. Bennett joined Local 672 in 2017 and 
authorized the deduction of union dues from her pay. She resigned her membership in 
2019 during a window for such resignations established in the dues deduction 
authorization card.  She sued, contending that she had had a constitutional right to 
resign at any time and that her membership in the union was coerced and involuntary 
because she had joined believing that her only alternative was to pay a fair share fee 
even though such fees were declared unconstitutional in Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, 
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).  She further alleged that the IELRA’s provision making AFSCME 
her exclusive representative violated her right to be free from compelled association 
with the union. 
The court held that Bennett’s decision to join the union was not obtained under physical 
or economic compulsion. The court opined that merely because Bennett would have 
made a different decision in 2017 had she realized that the Supreme Court would 




invalidate fair share fees a year later did not render her uncoerced decision void. The 
court reasoned that intervening changes in the law do not invalidate an otherwise lawful 
agreement. The court observed that criminal defendants are not allowed to withdraw 
plea agreements that waive their rights to appeal or collaterally attack their convictions 
merely because the Supreme Court subsequently modifies constitutional law or criminal 
procedure in their favor.  
Turning to Bennett’s constitutional challenge to AFSCME’s status as exclusive 
representative, the court observed that the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have 
upheld exclusive representation against constitutional attack, citing Minnesota State 
Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1985); Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d 
861 (7th Cir. 2017). The court concluded that Janus did not disturb the holdings of these 
cases.   
C. Preliminary Injunctive Relief 
In Board of Trustees of Triton Community College District No. 504 and Cook County 
College Teachers’ Union, Local 1600, IFT-AF, 36 PERI  ¶  96 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB  
denied the college district employer’s request for injunctive relief relating to two unfair 
practice charges in which the employer alleged the union engaged in bad faith 
bargaining and that the union engaged in an unlawful strike.  
In deciding whether injunctive relief was appropriate in each charge, the IELRB relied 
on Section 16(d) of the IELRA, which provides that the IELRB may petition the circuit 
court for appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order once an unfair labor 
practice complaint has been issued. The Board also relied on University of Illinois 
Hospital, 2 PERI 1138 (IELRB 1986), in which the Board held preliminary injunctive 
relief is appropriate where there is reasonable cause to believe that the Act may have 
been violated and where injunctive relief is just and proper. 
On November 4, 2019, Triton Community College District No. 504 filed two charges 
with the IELRB against Cook County College Teachers’ Union, Local 1600, IFT-AFT.  In 
the first charge, the College alleged the Union violated sections 14 (b)(3) and (1) of the 
IELRA when it withdrew from, proposed changes to and tried to renegotiate the parties’ 
tentative agreement for a successor collective bargaining agreement. The College also 
alleged that the Union engaged in regressive and bad faith bargaining, failed to 
designate agents with sufficient bargaining authority to engage in meaningful 
negotiations, failed to support the parties’ tentative agreement, and unlawfully failed 
and refused to bargain in good faith.  
On October 24, the parties reached and signed a tentative agreement. The agreement 
contained the following language: “By signing below, the parties agree that this is the 
settlement agreed to between them and shall be presented to their respective bodies for 
ratification and shall be recommended for approval.” The Union’s bargaining team 
presented the agreement to its membership as the College’s last, best, and final offer 
rather than as a tentative agreement. When the Union’s members sought answers to 




specific questions, the Union’s negotiators refused to reach out to the College and seek 
answers. On October 30, the bargaining unit rejected the agreement presented for 
ratification. The College argued that the Union, by distributing the tentative agreement 
to its membership with no explanation, presenting it as a last, best, and final offer, and 
subsequently withdrawing from that agreement on key terms and introducing new items 
at the very last minute of negotiations, breached its duty to support the tentative 
agreement.  
The IELRB found the facts as presented by the College sufficiently established 
reasonable cause to believe the Union had violated the IELRA but did not find the 
allegations serious and extraordinary enough to grant preliminary injunctive relief. The 
IELRB noted that while it was unusual that the misconduct was alleged by an 
educational employer against a labor organization the remedy would nonetheless be the 
same: the respondent could cease and desist from refusing to bargain as opposed to 
being subject to an injunction.  
In the second charge, the College alleged the Union violated Sections 14(b)(3) and (1) 
and Section 13(b) of the IELRA when it announced its intent to engage in a strike before 
completing all the requirements of Section 13(b) of the Act and when it engaged in a 
one-day strike on November 6. 
The College alleged the Union did not comply with the Section 13(b)(3) requirements: 
“that at least 10 days have elapsed after a notice of intent to strike has been given by the 
exclusive bargaining representative to the educational employer, the regional 
superintendent and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board” because the Union 
did not serve its notice of intent to strike on the superintendent.  
The IELRB held the College did not have a significant likelihood of prevailing on the 
merits of the case because it was unclear whether there was a regional superintendent 
with jurisdiction over the College, requiring the issue to be determined by an 
Administrative Law Judge. Furthermore, if no regional superintendent with jurisdiction 
over the College was found, the strike would have met the requirements in 13(b). 
While the IELRB, in Joliet Junior College, 8 PERI 1011 (IELRB 1991), granted a 
community college employer’s request to seek injunctive relief where the union engaged 
in a strike without serving the regional superintendent, the case could not be relied on in 
this case. Joliet Junior College had been granted relief because Section 13 had “no 
special rules dispensing with service of the Notice of Intent to Strike on the Regional 
Superintendent when the educational employer is a community college” at the time. 
However, the Section was amended in 2014 and now requires a notice of intent to strike 
to be served on a superintendent “if one exists with jurisdiction over the educational 
employer.” See 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1130.40(a). If there is no regional superintendent for 
community colleges, the union is excused from serving a notice of intent to strike on the 
regional superintendent.  




The Board also held preliminary injunctive relief was not just and proper, reasoning that 
there was nothing left for an injunction to restore. The strike at issue lasted one day, 
November 6, and the bargaining units had returned to work. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence of any threat of another strike. In fact, there was a letter from the Union 
President that clearly stated “there would not be another strike without fulfilling the 
statutory requirements in the IELRA.                
Accordingly, even if there was reasonable cause to believe that the Act may have been 
violated by the strike, preliminary injunctive relief was not just and proper in this 
second charge as well.  
II. IPLRA Developments 
 
A. Discrimination Based on Protected Activity 
In AFSCME Council 31 and County of DuPage (DuPage Care Center), 36 PERI ¶ 114 
(ILRB State Panel 2020), the State Panel reversed the Executive Director’s dismissal of 
an unfair practice charge that alleged that the DuPage Care Center (“DCC”) discharged a 
union steward because of his protected concerted activity. The ILRB found the Union 
submitted sufficient evidence to warrant issuance of a complaint. The case presented 
legal and factual disputes on whether the discharged employee engaged in protected 
activity and whether the employer was aware of the activity.  
During the initial investigation, the Executive Director found the following. On April 21, 
2019, Abderrahim Bezzaz, a certified nursing assistant (CNA) and member of the 
union’s collecting bargaining committee, arrived for an overtime shift at DCC. One 
nursing supervisor instructed him to report to a particular unit. A second nursing 
supervisor, Maria Bamberger, instructed him to go to a different unit. When Bezzaz 
questioned Bamberger’s instruction, she gave Bezzaz an ultimatum: report to 2-East 
unit or leave the facility. Bezzaz decided to leave.  
On April 23, 2019, Bezzaz attended an investigatory meeting regarding the events of 
April 21, 2019. During the meeting, DCC accused Bezzaz of “insubordination, using 
profanity, and abandoning his shift[,]” and using profanity and threatening language 
against Bamberger. On April 25, 2019, DCC sent Bezzaz a letter terminating his 
employment.  
The Charging Party argued that Bezzaz was terminated because he served as a union 
steward. Further, the Charging Party argued Bezzaz’s use of threatening language 
encompassed his threat to report Bamberger’s actions to the Union. The Charging Party 
argued this constituted “protected activity to seek union assistance.” The Executive 
Director found that the Charging Party failed to show a causal nexus between Bezzaz’s 
engagement in protected activity and his discharge. 
To establish a charge of discrimination for engaging in protected activity, a charging 
party must demonstrate that “(1) the employee at issue was engaged in union or 
protected concerted activity; (2) the employer knew of his conduct, and (3) the employer 




took the adverse action against him in whole or in part because of his protected 
conduct.”  
In this case, the State Panel found, Bezzaz was a union steward and involved in the 
negotiation of a first contract between the Union and DCC. DCC was aware of Bezzaz’s 
activities. Further, the ILRB concluded Bezzaz’s threat was protected because he 
“intended to seek assistance or mutual aid and protection from the Union” arising out of 
his dispute with Bamberger regarding his overtime shift. The Union also presented 
evidence that DCC initially responded to Bezzaz’s “threat” as an indication he was 
reporting Bamberger to the Union.  
The State Panel found the third prong sufficiently satisfied to warrant issuance of a 
complaint. Bezzaz was terminated only five months after AFSCME Council 31 was 
certified as the bargaining representative and while he was serving on the team 
negotiating the first contract. Further, Bezzaz’s threat to report Bamberger to the Union 
occurred only several days before he was terminated The ILRB found that these 
circumstances raised issues of fact concerning the causal connection between Bezzaz’s 
protected activity and his discharge, as well as whether DCC acted with intent to 
discourage membership in the union.  The State Panel concluded that a complaint 
should issue. 
 
 
